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Abstract This paper explores reactions to the stock markets shocks during quiet and 
turbulent times. In our investigation we use daily values of 28 stock exchanges 
indexes: 14 from developed markets and 14 from emerging markets. We find the 
global crisis induced, for most of the indexes, significant changes in the reactions to 
the shocks. The results also indicate different behaviors of indexes from developed 
markets in comparison with the indexes from emerging markets.  
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Introduction 
In the last decades, several researches analyzed the behavior of the financial 
assets returns after the shocks. There are two main approaches of this subject: 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), Overreaction Hypothesis (OH) and Underreaction 
Hypothesis (UH).  
Efficient Market Hypothesis presumes that investors behave rationally so 
prices reflect immediately all the available information (Fama, 1970). As a 
consequence, there are not return reversal for the days that follow a shock. 
Overreaction Hypothesis and Underreaction Hypothesis are related to the behavioral 
finance, which presume that investors don’t act always rationally and psychological 
factors influence their decisions. OH describes a situation where the market 
participants overreact to the positive shocks (caused by unexpected and extreme 
good news) and to the negative shocks (caused by unexpected and extreme bad 
news) correcting their behavior lately (De Bondt  and Thaler, 1985). Such evolutions 
could be exploited by employing a contrarian strategy in which past loser stocks are 
bought and past winner stocks are sold (Chan,1988). UH describes a situation where 
the investors underreact to the shocks and adjust their behavior in the next days 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). These circumstances could be exploited by 
momentum strategies which consist in buying the past winner stocks and selling the 
past loser stocks (Yu and Chen, 2011). 
Empirical researches investigated the reaction to the shocks of stock prices 
from various financial markets. De Bondt  and Thaler (1985) studied monthly returns 
of New York Stock Exchange common stocks for the period between January 1926 
and December 1982, founding evidences in the favor of OH. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) documented the underreaction presence on the US capital market. Lasfer et 
al. (2003) tested OH for indexes from 40 developed and emerging markets for a 
period between 1989 and 1997. Their results failed to prove the overreaction of stock 
prices. Spyrou et al. (2005) examined reactions to the shocks of four indexes from 
London Stock Exchange for the period 1989 to 2004. They found evidences in favor 
of EMH for large capitalization stock portfolios and in favor of UH for medium and 
small capitalization stock portfolios. Norli et al. (2009) and Morad and Salehi (2011) 
identified overreaction of stocks from Bursa Malaysia and from Tehran Stock 
Exchange.   
Some papers approached the circumstances which influence the stock returns 
reactions to shocks. Lasfer et al. (2003) found significant differences between the 
developed and the emerging markets regarding stock prices behavior in the periods 
following sharp changes. Norli et al. (2011) studied the reactions to shocks of stock 
prices from Bursa Malaysia over the period between January 1998 and December 
2009. They found that overreactions were more pronounced during the South East 
Asian Financial Crisis from 1997-1998 and during the actual Global Crisis that started 
in 2008 than during more quiet times. 
In this paper we investigate the reactions of stock prices to shocks before and 
during the actual global crisis. We employ daily values of representative indexes for 
the stock markets from a group of 28 countries.   
The remainder of the paper is divided into three main areas: the second part 
describes the data and methodology employed in our investigation, the third part 
presents the empirical results and the fourth part concludes.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
In our investigation we use daily closing values of the stock market indexes 
from 28 countries for a time period between January 2000 and December 2011. We 
use MSCI Index Base Dates to classify these indexes into two broad categories: 
developed markets and emerging markets. For each index we split the sample of 
data into two sub-samples: 
- first sub-sample, corresponding to a pre-crisis period, from 1st of January 
2000 to the 15th of September 2008 (when it was announced the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers); 
      - second sub-sample, corresponding to the global crisis period, from the 
16th of September 2008 to the 31st of December 2011. 
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where Pi,t and Pi,t-1 are closing price of index i on the days t and t-1, 
respectively. 
We identify the positive and negative shocks following the method used by 
Lasfer et al. (2003). We consider that a positive shock occurs in a day t+ if the 
following condition is satisfied: 
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where +tir ,  is the return of the index i from the day t
+
, AVG (ri,[-60;-11]) is the 
average daily returns for a period that starts  60 days before the day t+, and ends 11 
days before the day t+, while STD (ri,[-60;-11]) is the standard deviation for the same 
period.  
We consider that a negative shock occurs in a day t- if the following condition 
is satisfied: 
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where  
−tir ,  is the return of the index i from the day t
-
. 
We extract the autonomous shocks from the positive or negative shocks we 
detected by excluding the successive shocks. We define a successive shock as one 
that occurs less than 10 days after an autonomous shock.  
In order to identify over, under and efficient reactions we calculate the post-
shocks abnormal returns (ARi,t) using the formula: 
 
ARi,t = ri,t - AVG(ri,[-60;-11])                                                (4) 
 
For each autonomous shock we compute the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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where ntiCAR , is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the index i for the next n 
days that follow an autonomous shock from a day t. 
We calculate the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the index i for the 
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We test, by t-statistics, for each autonomous shock, the significance of 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Based on the significance of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns we classify the after shock behaviors of returns into three 
categories: 
- overreactions, when a positive shock is followed by significant negative 
abnormal returns or when a negative shock is followed by significant positive 
abnormal returns; 
- underreactions, when a positive shock is followed by significant positive 
abnormal returns or when a negative shock is followed by significant negative 
abnormal returns; 
-  efficient reactions, when we don’t find significant positive or negative 




Table 1 presents the number of the autonomous shocks and the mean 
reactions associated to them before the global crisis. Excepting BUX Index, for all the 
indexes the number of negative shocks surpasses the number of positive shocks. In 
general, the magnitude of shocks was bigger in case of emerging markets in 
comparison with developed markets. 
 
Table 1 - Shocks before the global crisis 
 
Positive shocks Negative shocks Index 
Number of 
shocks 






























Straits 14 2.49452 22 -2.31344 










































Panel B: Emerging Markets 
 




































































Notes: t-statistic appear in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
 
During the global crisis there were five indexes for which the number of 
positive shocks exceeded the number of negative shocks: AEX General, Strait 
Times, FTSE 100, CROBEX and BUX (Table 2). For two indexes (All Ordinaries and 
KLSE Composite) the number of positive shocks equaled the number of negative 
shocks. The magnitude of shocks from emerging markets sharply rose, so the 
differences between the two markets decreased. 
 
Table 2 - Shocks during the global crisis 
 
Positive shocks Negative shocks Index 
Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction Number of shocks Mean reaction 
 







































































Panel B: Emerging Markets 
 


































































Notes: t-statistic appear in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
 
The Table 3 presents Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a positive shock 
before the global crisis. In case of developed markets we find symptoms of 
underreaction for five indexes (AEX General, BEL 20, CAC 40, DAX and FTSE 100) 
and of overreaction for a single index (Strait Times) while for the other eight the 
results suggest efficient reactions to positive shocks. In the case of emerging markets 
we found a single index, BET-C, which underreacted while the rest of thirteen 
indexes displayed efficient reactions. 
 
Table 3 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a positive shock before the global crisis 
 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
 
Panel A: Developed Markets 
 
























































































Swiss Market 0.21672 0.193543 0.241581 0.377052 0.404181 0.265982 
(1.27311) (0.81668) (0.644021) (0.952368) (0.781963) (0.282781) 

































































































































































































































































Notes: t-statistic appear in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
 
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a negative shock before the 
global crisis are presented in Table 4. For the developed markets, the results indicate 
the underreaction of five indexes (AEX General, BEL 20, Taiwan Weighted, S&P TSX 
Composite and All Ordinaries), the overreaction of two indexes (Strait Times and 
Standard & Poor's) and the efficient reaction of the other seven indexes. For the 
emerging markets we find six indexes which underreacted (Seoul Composite, BSE 
30, Jakarta Composite, BUX, MerVal and KLSE Composite) while the other eight 
reacted efficiently.  
 
Table 4 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a negative shock before the global crisis 
 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
 












































































































CAC 40 -0.321939 -0.240247 -0.494722 -1.03981 -0.632293 -0.801768 
























































































































































































































































Notes: t-statistic appear in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
 
Table 5 provides the Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a positive shock 
during the global crisis. In the case of developed markets, we identify underreaction 
for three indexes (AEX General, Taiwan Weighted and Swiss Market) and efficient 
reaction for the rest of eleven indexes. In the case of emerging markets we found 
three indexes which underreacted  (BSE 30, KLSE Composite and IPC), a single 
index  which overreacted  (TA 100) while the rest of ten indexes reacted efficiently. 
 
Table 5 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a positive shock during the global crisis 
 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
 
Panel A: Developed Markets 
 





































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: t-statistic appear in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
 The Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a negative shock during the 
global crisis are presented in Table 6. For the developed markets we detect four 
indexes which underreacted (AEX General, Taiwan Weighted, DAX and Nikkei 225), 
two indexes which overreacted (ATX and Swiss Market) while the rest of eight 
indexes reacted efficiently. In case of emerging markets the results indicate 
underreaction for four indexes (CROBEX, Jakarta Composite, Shanghai Composite 
and BUX) and efficient reactions for the rest of twelve indexes.  
 
Table 6 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a negative shock during the global crisis 
 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
 




















































































































































-0.193278 -0.653255 -0.891672 0.401068 -0.870442 -0.967314 
(-0.730443) (-1.15678) (-1.35419) (0.585543) (-0.995995) (-0.615489) 



















































































































































































































In this paper we approached the reactions to shocks of the 28 indexes before 
and during the global crisis. Our investigation revealed different behaviors from the 
two periods of time between indexes from developed and emerging markets. Before 
the crisis, the magnitude of shocks from emerging markets was larger in comparison 
with the developed markets. After the global crisis had began this difference 
decreased. This evolution could be explained by the different perceptions regarding 
the two markets. In general, on the emerging markets, investors are aware about the 
possibility of sharp unexpected changes that could occur. Instead, for transactions 
from the developed markets, after many years of relative stability, many investors 
were taken by surprise by the new turbulent period.   
The efficient reactions to positive shocks from developed markets were more 
consistent during the global crisis than before while the overreactions and 
underreactions became less visible. Most of the positive shocks during the global 
crisis occurred in the short periods when the financial markets displayed some 
symptoms of recovery but many investors were cautious about the sustainability of 
these evolutions. The reactions to negative shocks of the indexes from developed 
markets experienced some changes to the global crisis in comparison with the 
precedent period of time. For some indexes the symptoms of underreactions and 
overreactions disappeared while for other indexes these symptoms just appeared. 
The negative shocks for developed markets during the global crisis were caused by 
various factors (difficulties of commercial banks, public debt crisis etc.) and their 
impact was different from country to country. 
In the case of emerging markets, before the global crisis, a single index (BET-
C, from the Bucharest Stock Exchange, which experienced a significant ascendant 
trend) underreacted to positive shocks while the others displayed efficient reactions. 
During the global crisis, the underreactions and overreactions from emerging markets 
to the positive shocks became more consistent in detriment of the efficient reactions.  
These changes could be linked to the nature of a part of positive shocks during the 
global crisis. In the circumstances of the global crisis many investors could perceive 
the emerging markets more attractive than the developed markets and their 
transactions could generate positive shocks. The efficient reactions of indexes from 
emerging markets to negative shocks became more consistent during the global 
crisis than before. This evolution could be explained by the various nature of the 
factors that caused negative shocks (contagion from developed markets, domestic 
circumstances etc.) 
This investigation could be extended by performing separate analysis for each 
distinct phase of the global crisis.  
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